We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multidimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism designer, on the other hand, aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting which is motivated by the foreseeable future form of online advertising.
Introduction
Billions of transactions are carried out via exchanges at every given day, and the number of transactions and exchanges continues to grow as the need for competitiveness promotes adoption. The design of one-sided incentive compatible (truthful bidding) mechanisms for exchanges is relatively well understood. However, incentive compatible multi-sided mechanisms present a significantly more challenging problem as they introduce more sophisticated requirements such as budget balance.
More specifically, we are interested in designing exchanges (mechanisms) for multi-sided markets with strategic players. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism designer, on the other hand, aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade (the difference between the total value of the sold goods for the buyers and the total costs of these goods for the sellers). The design of such mechanisms raises a few interesting questions. Can the mechanism maintain simultaneously different desirable economic properties such as: individual rationality (IR)-participants do not lose by participation, incentive compatibility (IC)-players are incentivized to report their true information to the mechanism and budget balance (BB)-the mechanism does not end up with a loss. Moreover, can the mechanism maintain these properties while suffering only a bounded loss compared to the optimal gain from trade? Finally, can this be done when all the players have a multi-dimensional strategic space? 1 The above questions can be studied in the context of many multi-sided markets. We focus on one such market, and leave the consideration of other multi-sided markets for future work. The market we consider is motivated by online advertising in its foreseeable future form. Online advertising currently supports some of the most important Internet services, including: search, social media and user generated content sites. However, the amount of information that companies collect about users increasingly creates privacy concerns in society as a whole, and even more so in the European society. In recent years EU regulators have actively been looking for solutions to guarantee that users' privacy is preserved. In particular, the EU regulators have been looking for tools that enable the end user to configure their privacy settings so that only information allowed by the end-user is collected by online advertising platforms.
The market we study is induced by a new solution we suggest for the above privacy issue. In this solution mediators serve as the interface between end-users and the other players in the online advertising market. Each user informs his mediator of the attributes she is willing to reveal, and her cost, i.e., the compensation she requires for every ad she views. The mediator then tries to "sell" the user on the advertising market based only on the attributes she agreed to reveal, and, if successful, pays her the appropriate cost out of the amount he got from the sell.
As revealing more attributes is likely to result in a more profitable sale, our solution provides incentives for users to share their information with the advertising market while allowing users to retain control of the amount of information they would like to share. Notice that the fact that our solution motivates users to participate in the advertising market, and even to provide more precise information for targeting campaigns, means that our solution improves the efficiency of the advertising system and the digital economy as a whole (in addition to answering the privacy concerns discussed above). This is in sharp contrast to other natural approaches for dealing with privacy issues, such as cryptography based approaches, which reduce the amount of information available to the advertisers but give them nothing in return.
The advertising market induced by the above solution has mediators on one side, and advertisers on the other side. Each mediator has a set of users associated with him, and he is trying to assign these users to advertisers using the market. Each one of the users has a non-negative cost which she has to be paid if she is assigned to an advertiser. The mediators themselves have no cost of their own, however, each of them has to pay his users their cost if they are assigned to advertisers. Thus, the utility of a mediator is the amount paid to him minus the total cost of his users that are assigned. Finally, each advertiser has a positive capacity determining the number of users she is interested in targeting, and she gains a non-negative value from every one of the users assigned to her (as long as her capacity is not exhausted). Thus, the advertiser's utility is her value multiplied by the number of users assigned to her (as long as this number does not exceed her capacity) minus her total payment.
A mechanism for the above market knows the mediators and the advertisers, but has no knowledge about their parameters or about the users. The objective of the mechanism is to find an assignment of users to advertisers that maximizes the gain from trade. In addition, the mechanism also decides how much to charge (pay) each advertiser (mediator). In order to achieve these goals, the mechanism receives reports from the advertisers and mediators. Each advertiser reports her capacity and value, and each mediator reports the number of his users and their costs. The mediators and advertisers are strategic, and thus, free to send incorrect reports. In other words, an advertiser may report incorrect capacity and value, and a mediator may report any subset of his users and associate an arbitrary cost with each user. We say that an advertiser is truthful if she reports correctly her capacity and value. A mediator is considered truthful if he reports to the mechanism his true number of users and the true costs of these users. Notice that we assume that the costs of the users are known to their corresponding mediators, i.e., the users are non-strategic. This assumption is reasonable given the high speed of the online advertising market, especially compared to the speed at which a private user can change her contract with her mediator.
To better understand the design challenge raised by this market, we observe that even if our setting is reduced to a single buyer-single seller exchange, still it is well known from [12] that maximizing gain from trade while maintaining individual rationality and incentive compatibility perforce to run into deficit (is not budget balanced). A well known circumvention of [12] 's impossibility is [11] 's trade reduction for the simple setting of double sided auctions. In [11] 's setting trade is conducted between multiple strategic sellers offering identical goods to multiple strategic buyers, where each seller is selling a single good and each buyer is interested in buying a single good. The result of [11] relaxes the requirement for optimal trade by means of a trade reduction. The trade reduction leads to an individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balance mechanism. Following [11] 's work several other mechanisms were designed using the technique of trade reduction. However, all the trade reduction mechanisms suggested in the literature to date allow only players with single dimensional strategic spaces.
Our Contribution
Given that existing trade reduction solutions do not apply in our setting, we describe new doublesided mechanisms able to handle mediators and advertisers with multi-dimensional strategic spaces. Our mechanisms guarantee desirable economic properties, and at the same time yield a gain from trade approximating the optimal gain from trade. If being truthful is a dominant strategy 2 for each advertiser and each mediator (regardless of other players' strategies), then the mechanism is incentive compatible (IC); if no advertiser and no mediator have a negative utility by participating truthfully in the mechanism than it is individually rational (IR). Our objective is to construct mechanisms that are IC and IR.
We first study a special case of our setting where the advertisers' capacities are publicly known (however, these capacities need not be all equal). The set of users of each mediator, on the other hand, remains unknown to the mechanism (i.e., the mechanism only learns about it through the mediator's report). For this case we present a deterministic mechanism we term "Price by Removal Mechanism" (PRM) that works as follows: for every mediator find a threshold cost, and remove users of the mediator whose cost is above this threshold. Add a dummy advertiser with value that is the maximum threshold cost computed for the mediators and a capacity that is equal to the total number of users remaining. Assign the non-removed users to the advertisers using a VCG auction [16, 6, 10] in which the users are the goods and the bidders are the advertisers. Price the mediators according to their threshold cost, and price the advertisers according to the prices of the VCG auction describe above.
The method used to calculate the threshold costs of the above mechanism induce its properties. We prove that, for appropriately chosen threshold costs, the above mechanism is IC, IR, BB and provides a non-trivial approximation for the optimal gain from trade. More formally, if τ is the size of the optimal trade, and γ is an upper bound, known to the mechanism, on the maximum capacity of any player (mediator or advertiser), then:
PRM generalizes the trade reduction ideas used so far in the literature for single dimensional strategic players, but is much more involved. Intuitively, PRM differs from previous ideas by the following observation. A trading set is the smallest set of players that is required for trade to occur. In the existing literature for single dimensional strategic players a trade reduction mechanism makes a binary decision regarding every trading set of the optimal trade, i.e., either the trading set is removed as a whole, or it is kept. On the other hand, dealing with multi-dimensional players requires PRM to remove only parts of some trading sets, and thus, requires it to make non-binary decisions. Our deterministic mechanism PRM handles one type of multi-dimensional players (the mediators) and one type of single dimensional strategic space players (the advertisers). In order to enrich our strategic space even further, and allow advertisers to have multi-dimensional strategic spaces as well, we present also a randomized mechanism termed "Threshold by Partition Mechanism" (TPM). TPM applies to our general setting, i.e., we no longer assume that any capacity is known to the mechanism, and it works as follows: divide the set of mediators uniformly at random into to two sets (M 1 and M 2 ) and divide the set of advertiser uniformly at random, as well, into two sets (A 1 and A 2 ). Then use the optimal trade for M 2 and A 2 to produce threshold cost and threshold value that allow BB pricing as well as the needed reduction in trade for M 1 and A 1 . Analogously, use the optimal trade for M 1 and A 1 to produce threshold cost and threshold value that allow BB pricing as well as the needed reduction in trade for M 2 and A 2 .
The above description of TPM is not complete since the use of threshold cost and value from one pair (M i , A i ) to reduce the trade in the other pair might create an unbalanced reduction. To overcome this issue we create two random low priority sets: one of advertisers and the other of mediators. Then, whenever the reduction in trade is unbalanced, we remove additional low priority mediators or advertisers in order to restore balance (which can be done with high probability). The following theorem shows that the above mechanism is IC, IR, BB and provides a non-trivial approximation for the optimal gain from trade. The parameter α is an upper bound, known to the mechanism, on the ratio between the maximum capacity of any player (mediator or advertiser) and the size of the optimal trade. 3
We note that TPM is universally truthful, i.e., its IC property holds for every given choice of the random coins of the mechanism.
One drawback of our results is that the competitive ratios guaranteed by Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 are non-trivial only when no single advertiser or mediator has a large market power and the mechanism has access to a good bound on the maximum market power of any player. From a practical point of view we believe these assumption are both plausible. The number of agents using any given real life ad-exchange is usually very large, and the mechanism can use the large quantity of historical data available to it to estimate the bound it needs. From a more theoretical point of view, the impossibility result of [12] shows that no non-trivial competitive ratio can be achieved when one advertiser and one mediator control all the trade. This suggests, although we are unable to prove it formally, that the competitive ratio must deteriorate as a single advertiser or mediator gains more and more market power (i.e., when γ and α increase).
Related Work
From a motivational point of view the most closely related literature to our work consists of works that involve mediators and online advertising markets, such as [1, 7, 15] . These works differ from ours in two crucial points. First, despite being motivated by the online display ads network exchange, the models studied by these works are actually auctions (i.e., one-sided mechanisms). Thus, they need not deal with the challenges and impossibility integrated by the double-sided structure of our market and the requirement to keep it from running into a deficit. Second, our focus is maximization of the gain from trade, unlike the above works which focus on revenue maximization.
Another related work involving both markets and mediators studies the phenomenon of markets in which individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries, who determine prices via strategic considerations [4] . An essential difference between the model of [4] and our model is that [4] does not assume private values for the players, and therefore, the impossibility of [12] does not apply in its model.
Last but not least is the literature on trade reduction and multi-sided markets. Deterministic mechanisms using trade reduction as a mean to achieve IC, IR and BB were described for various settings [11, 5, 2, 9, 13, 3] . Moreover, for a variant of the setting of [11, 3] , [14] obtained a randomized mechanism achieving IC, IR and strong budget balance (i.e., it is BB and leaves no surplus for the market maker). The mutual grounds of all these settings is that all players participating in the trade have a single dimension strategic space. This idea was captured by [9] which provided a single trade reduction procedure applicable to all the above settings. In addition, [9] also defined a class of problems that can be solved by its suggested trade reduction procedure. Essentially this classification is based on partitioning the players participating in the trading set into equivalence classes.
As pointed out in the previous subsection, both our presented mechanisms extend significantly on the existing trade reduction literature. More specifically, even when all advertisers have known equal capacities (while mediators can still have a variable number of users), fitting our model into the classification of [9] still requires each mediator to have his own equivalence class (because a mediator with many users can always replace a mediator with a few users within a trading set, but by the formula α = γ/τ . We chose to formulate Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 in terms of the parameter that the mechanism corresponding to each theorem assumes access to. the reverse is often not true). It follows that [9] 's trade reduction procedure might remove all the trade, and thus, achieves only a trivial gain from trade approximation.
Notation and Basic Observations
We begin this section with a more formal presentation of our model. Our model consists of a set P of users, a set M of mediators and a set A of advertisers. Each user p ∈ P has a non-negative cost c(p) which she has to be paid if she is assigned to an advertiser. The users are partitioned among the mediators, and we denote by P (m) ⊆ P the set of users associated with mediator m ∈ M (i.e., the sets {P (m) | m ∈ M } form a disjoint partition of P ). The utility of a mediator m ∈ M is the amount he is paid minus the total cost he has to forward to his assigned users; hence, if x(p) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for the event that user p ∈ P (m) is assigned and t is the payment received by m, then the utility of m is t − p∈P (m) x(p) · c(p). Finally, each advertiser a ∈ A has a positive capacity u(a), and she gains a non-negative value v(a) from every one of the first u(a) users assigned to her; thus, if advertiser a is assigned n ≤ u(a) users and has to pay t then her utility is n · v(a) − t.
A mechanism for our model accepts reports from the advertisers and mediators, and based on these reports outputs an assignment of users to advertisers. In addition, the mechanism also decides how much to charge (pay) each advertiser (mediator). The objective of the mechanism is to output an assignment of users to advertisers that maximizes the gain from trade.
For ease of the presentation, it is useful to associate a set B(a) of u(a) slots with each advertiser a ∈ A. We then think of the users as assigned to slots instead of directly to advertisers. Formally, let B be the set of all slots (i.e., B = a∈A B(a)), then an assignment is a set S ⊆ B × P in which no user or slot appears in more than one ordered pair. We say that an assignment S assigns a user p to slot b if (p, b) ∈ S. Similarly, we say that an assignment S assigns user p to advertiser a if there exists a slot b ∈ B(a) such that (p, b) ∈ S. It is also useful to define values for the slots. For every slot b of advertiser a, we define the value v(b) of b as equal to the value v(a) of a. Using this notation, the gain from trade of an assignment S can be stated as
In addition to the above notation, we would like to define two additional shorthands that we use occasionally. Given a set A ′ ⊆ A of advertisers, we denote by B(A ′ ) = a∈A ′ B(a) the set of slots belonging to advertisers of A ′ . Similarly, given a set M ′ ⊆ M of mediators, P (M ′ ) = m∈M ′ P (m) is the set of users associated with mediators of M ′ .
Comparison of Costs and Values
The presentation of our mechanisms is simpler when the values of slots and the costs of users are all unique. Clearly, this is extremely unrealistic as all the slots of a given advertiser have the exact same value in our model. Thus, we simulate uniqueness using a tie-breaking rule. The rule we assume works as follows:
• The mechanism chooses an arbitrary order σ on the mediators and advertisers. It is important that this order is chosen independently of the reports received by the mechanism. The mechanism then uses this order to break ties when comparing users to slots and when comparing between users (slots) associated with different mediators (advertisers). For example, when comparing the cost of user p with the value of a slot b, the mechanism breaks ties in favor of p if and only if the mediator of p appears earlier than the advertiser of b in σ.
• We assume that the report of every mediator induces some order on the set of users of this mediators. The mechanism uses this order to break ties between the costs of users belonging to the same mediator. • Finally, since the slots of a given advertiser are all identical and non-strategic (recall that slots were introduced into the model just for the purpose of simplifying the presentation), any method can be used for tie-breaking between the slots of a given advertiser. In the rest of this paper when costs/values are compared, unless it is explicitly specified that they are compared as numbers, the comparison is assumed to use the above tie breaking rule. Note that this assumption implies that two values (costs) are equal if and only if they belong to the same slot (user). We now prove a useful observation that follows from the way we defined the tie-breaking rule.
Observation 2.1. When the slots are ordered in an increasing (or decreasing) value order, all the slots of a single advertiser are always consecutive.
Proof. Let b 1 and b 2 be two slots of one advertiser, and let b be an arbitrary slot of another advertiser. It is enough to prove that
implies that the advertiser of b 1 (and b 2 ) appears later in σ than the advertiser of b, and thus, we also have v(b 2 ) < v(b).
Canonical Assignment
Given a set B ′ ⊆ B of slots and a set P ′ ⊆ P of users, the canonical assignment S c (P ′ , B ′ ) is the assignment constructed by the following process. First, we order the slots of B ′ in a decreasing value order b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b |B ′ | and the users of P ′ in an increasing cost order p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p |P ′ | . Then, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|B ′ |, |P ′ |}, the canonical assignment S c (B ′ , P ′ ) assigns user p i to slot b i if and only if v(b i ) > c(p i ). The canonical assignment is an important tool used frequently by the mechanisms we describe in the next sections. In some places we refer to the user or slot at location i of a canonical solution S c (P ′ , B ′ ). By using this expression we mean user p i or slot b i , respectively. Additionally, the term |S c (P, B)| is used very often in our proofs, and thus, it is useful to define the shorthand τ = |S c (P, B)|.
The following lemma shows that the above definition of τ is consistent with the use of τ in Section 1.1 as the size of the optimal trade.
in which we keep only the assignments of the first i users. More formally,
Let i * be the largest i such that S i c (P ′ , B ′ ) is contained in some assignment S * ⊆ P ′ × B ′ maximizing GfT(S * ) among all the possible assignments of users of P ′ to slots of B ′ . Such an i * clearly exists since S 0 c (P ′ , B ′ ) = ∅ is a subset of every feasible assignment. There are two cases to consider. The first case is when i * = min{|B ′ |, |P ′ |}. In this case the canonical assignment S c (P ′ , B ′ ) is a subset of the optimal assignment S * . Let us consider an arbitrary ordered pair (p j , b k ) ∈ S * \ S c (P ′ , B ′ ), and let us assume, without loss of generality, that j ≤ k. Since S * is a legal assignment and (p j , b k ) belongs to S * together with all the ordered pairs of S c (P ′ , B ′ ), the ordered pair (p j , b j ) cannot belong to S c (P ′ , B ′ ). By definition, this implies c(p j ) > v(b j ), and thus, c(p j ) ≥ v(b j ) even when we compare them as numbers. Thus,
Summing the above inequality over all ordered pairs (p j , b k ) ∈ S * \ S c (P ′ , B ′ ), we get:
which completes the proof of the lemma for the case i * = min{|B ′ |, |P ′ |}. The second case we need to consider is the case 0 ≤ i * < min{|B ′ |, |P ′ |}. In the rest of the proof we show that this case can never happen, which implies the lemma.
Assume towards a contradiction 0 ≤ i * < min{|B ′ |, |P ′ |}. Our objective is to show that there exists an assignment
There are now three cases that need to be considered:
can be added to S * without violating the feasibility, then we choose
also when we compare them as numbers. Thus,
• When the previous case does not hold, there must be in S * either an ordered pair containing p i * +1 or an ordered pair containing b i * +1 . In the current case we assume that S * contains an ordered pair containing p i * +1 , but does not contain an ordered pair containing b i * +1 . The case that S * contains both an ordered pair containing p i * +1 and an ordered pair containing b i * +1 is the next case we consider. Finally, the case that S * contains an ordered pair containing b i * +1 , but does not contain an ordered pair containing p i * +1 is analogous to the current case, and is, thus, omitted.
This means that the slot b of the pair (p i * +1 , b) ∈ S * cannot be one of the first i * slots, and thus, obeys v(b) ≤ v(b i * +1 ). We now consider the assignment
• The last case we need to consider is when S * contains both an ordered pair (p i * +1 , b) containing user p i * +1 and an ordered pair (p, b i * +1 ) containing slot b i * +1 . In this case we choose
Deterministic Mechanism
In this section we describe the deterministic mechanism "Price by Removal Mechanism" (PRM) for our model. Recall that PRM assumes public knowledge of the advertisers' capacities. Accordingly, we assume throughout this section that the capacities of the advertisers are common knowledge (or that the advertisers are not strategic about them). We also assume that PRM has access to a value γ ≥ 1 such that:
In other words, γ is an upper bound on how large can be the capacity of an advertiser or the number of users of a mediator. Informally, γ can be understood as a bound on the importance every single advertiser or mediator can have. A description of PRM is given as Mechanism 1. Notice that Mechanism 1 often refers to parameters of the model that are not known to the mechanism (i.e., values of advertiser, the number of users of mediators and the costs of users). Whenever this happens, this should be understood as referring to the reported values of these parameters. 2. For every mediator m ∈ M , letP (m) be the set of users of mediator m whose cost is less than c m . Intuitively,P (m) is the set of users of mediator m that the mechanism tries to assign to advertisers.
3. Assign the users of m∈MP (m) to the advertisers using a VCG auction. More specifically, the users of m∈MP (m) are the items sold in the auction, and the bidders are the advertisers of A plus a dummy advertiser a d whose value and capacity are v(a d ) = max m∈M c m and u(a d ) = m∈M |P (m)|, respectively. 4. Charge every non-dummy advertiser by the same amount she is charged (as a bidder) by the VCG auction.
5.
For every user p assigned by the VCG auction, pay c m to the mediator m of p. 4
Remark: It can be shown that the existence of the dummy advertiser never affects the behavior of Mechanism 1, and thus, one can safely omit it from the mechanism. Nevertheless, we keep this advertiser in the above description of the mechanism since its existence simplifies our proof that the mechanism is BB. Let us recall our result regarding PRM.
PRM improves over the trade reduction procedure of [9] by guarantying a non-trivial competitive ratio even in the presence of players (mediators) with a multi-dimensional strategic space. However, the competitive ratio guaranteed by PRM is slightly worse than the competitive ratio guaranteed by the procedure of [9] when the players have single dimensional strategic spaces (which is 1 − 2/τ ). The next paragraph gives an intuitive explanation why it does not seem possible to improve the competitive ratio of PRM to match the competitive ratio of 1 − 2/τ guaranteed by [9] 's procedure.
Observe that PRM needs to maintain IC for both mediators and advertisers. In order to maintain IC for the mediators the price for each mediator has to be computed while all his users are reduced from the trade. This is why the real reduction in trade might be larger by up to γ compared to the reduction 4γ explicitly stated by PRM, which explains the gap between the competitive ratio of 1 − 5γ/τ and the explicit reduction of 4γ in the mechanism. It remains to understand why the explicit reduction is set to 4γ. The most significant difficulty in guaranteeing IC for the advertisers is that an advertiser might change her report in order to affect the costs {c m } m∈M of the mediators, and through them, manipulate the items offered in the VCG auction. PRM tackles this difficulty by guaranteeing that advertisers performing such manipulations are assigned no users. Since the users of mediator m are removed when c m is calculated, securing this guarantee requires that advertisers having a slot in one of the last γ locations of the optimal trade are assigned no users. As an advertiser might have up to γ slots, this translates into a requirement that an advertiser whose earliest slot is in one of the last 2γ locations of the optimal trade is assigned no users. Moreover, to simplify the proof our analysis in fact requires that an advertiser whose earliest slot is in one of the last 3γ locations of the optimal trade is assigned no users. Taking into account, again, the fact that the users of mediator m are removed when c m is calculated, guaranteeing the last property requires a trade reduction of 4γ. To summarize, maintaining the advertisers' IC imposes an explicit trade reduction of 3γ that we present as 4γ for the sake of simplicity, and maintaining the mediators' IC implies that the real trade reduction is larger by up to γ compared to the explicit one. Thus, a competitive ratio of 1 − 4γ τ seems to be inevitable in order to allow multi-dimensional strategic spaces.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 1.1. We begin with some basic properties of PRM. It is important to remember while reading the next proofs that the constructions of S c (P, B) and S c (P \ P (m), B) order the slots of B in the same order, and that the order of the users of P \ P (m) in the construction of S c (P \ P (m), B) is obtained by removing the users of P (m) from the order used by the construction of S c (P, B). 
). On the other hand, let b τ +1 and p τ +1 be the slot and user at location τ + 1 of S c (P, B) , respectively. Clearly b τ +1 and b ′ τ +1 are exactly the same slot. Moreover, p ′ τ +1 is either equal to p τ +1 or appears in S c (P, B) in a larger location than p τ +1 . Hence,
which is a contradiction since p τ +1 is not assigned to b τ +1 by S c (P, B) .
Using the last observation we can now prove the following lemma. • All the users ofP m are assigned by S c (P, B) .
Proof. First, let us explain why the second claim we need to prove follows from the first one. If c m = −∞, thenP m = ∅ and the second claim is trivial. Otherwise, the first claim states that p m is assigned by the canonical assignment S c (P, B) . By the definition of a canonical assignment, all the users having a lower cost than c m = c(p m ) are assigned by S c (P, B) as well. The second claim now follows sinceP m contains only users having a lower cost than c m . It remains to prove the first claim. The claim is trivial when c m = −∞, thus, we assume c m = −∞. Let F be the set of users that are assigned by S c (P, B) (P, B) ). (P, B) . Hence,
Let B ′ be the set of slots assigned users by S c (P, B) , and let b τ be the slot at location τ in S c (P, B). Since p τ is assigned to b τ by S c (P, B), we get: v(b τ ) > c(p τ ) ≥ max m∈M ′ c m . Moreover, v(b τ ) lower bounds the value of any slot in B ′ , and thus, all the slots of B ′ have values larger than max m∈M ′ c m . Combining this with the observation that |B ′ | = τ , we get that there exists a set A ′ ⊆ A of advertisers with the following properties:
• The advertisers of A ′ all have values larger than max m∈M ′ c m = max m∈M c m , and thus, larger than the value of the dummy advertiser a d , and larger than the cost of any user in m∈M ′Pm = m∈MP m . • The advertisers of A ′ have a total capacity at least τ ≥ | m∈MP m |, where the inequality holds since Lemma 3.2 guarantees that the users of m∈MP m are all assigned by S c (P, M ). The two above properties imply together that the VCG auction (and thus, also PRM) assigns all the users of m∈MP m to real advertisers. As no user is assigned to the dummy advertiser, and the dummy advertiser has a value of max m∈M c m , the VCG auction charges the real advertisers at least max m∈M c m for every user assigned to them. On the other hand, max m∈M c m upper bounds the payment a mediator receives from PRM for a single assigned user, and thus, PRM is budget balanced.
The Competitive Ratio of PRM
In this section we analyze the competitive ratio of PRM, and show that it is at least 1 − 5γ/τ . If 5γ ≥ τ , then this is trivial. Thus, we assume throughout this section 5γ < τ . Proof. Let j ′ and j be the locations of p in S c (P \ P (m), B) and S c (P, B), respectively. Clearly j ′ ≤ j, and thus, the slot at location j ′ in S c (P \ P (m), B) has a value larger or equal to the value of the slot at location j in S c (P, B). This means that p must be assigned by S c (P \ P (m), B) since it is assigned by S c (P, B) .
Let us denote by c e the cost of the user at location τ − 5γ of the canonical assignment S c (P, B) . Using the last observation we get:
Proof. Let L be the set of the users at locations τ − 5γ to τ of S c (P, B) . Clearly all the users of L have a cost equal or larger than c e . On the other hand, observe that by Observation 3.4 all the users of L \ P (m) are assigned by S c (P \ P (m), B). Hence, the number of users of L that are assigned by S c (P \ P (m), B) is at least:
Recall that p m is selected as the user at location |S c (P \ P (m), B)| − 4γ in S c (P \ P (m), B). This, together with the observation that S c (P, \P (m), B) assigns at least 4γ + 1 users of L, implies that one of the following must be true: either p m is a user of L, or there exists a user of L that has a smaller location in S c (P, \P (m), B) than p m , and thus, has a lower cost than p m . In both cases the lemma follows. 5 Recall thatP m is defined as the set of all users of P (m) whose cost is less than c m . Together with the previous observation, this givesP e ∩ P (m) ⊆P m for every mediator m ∈ M , and therefore, P e ⊆ m∈MP m . Notice now that Lemma 3.2 states that all the users of m∈MP m are assigned by PRM. Hence, in particular, the users of the subsetP e are all assigned by PRM.
Denote by S the assignment produced by PRM. Then:
where the inequality holds by the above discussion and the observation that every user assigned by PRM belongs to ∪ m∈MPm , and thus, has a cost of at most max m∈M c m . The VCG auction assigns the users in a way that maximizes the total value of the advertisers from the assigned users. This means that the |S| users assigned by S are assigned to the slots at locations 1 to |S| of S c (P, B). Let us denote this set of slots by B S . Additionally, let us denote bȳ B e the set of slots at locations 1 to |P e | in S c (P, B). Then, 5 In fact, it can be shown that the second case never happens.
where the inequality holds due to two observations: firstB e is a subset of B S since at least |B e | = |P e | users are assigned by S. Second, the dummy advertiser a d has a value of max m∈M c m , and thus, every slot of B S has a value of at least max m∈M c m since the VCG auction preferred assigning a user to this slot over assigning it to a d .
Plugging the last inequality into Inequality (1) gives: (P, B) ) ,
where the second inequality holds sinceP e (B e ) contains, by definition, the τ − 5γ users (slots) with the lowest costs (highest values) among the τ users (slots) assigned by the canonical assignment S c (P, B) . The corollary now follows from the last inequality since S c (P, B) is an assignment of users from P to slots of B maximizing the gain from trade.
The Incentive Properties of PRM
In this section we prove the incentive parts of Theorem 1.1. We begin with a lemma analyzing the incentive properties of PRM for mediators.
Lemma 3.7. For every mediator m, PRM is IR for m, and truthfulness is a dominant strategy for him.
Proof. PRM calculates a threshold c m based on the reports of advertisers and mediators other than m, and thus, c m is independent of the report of m. For every user p ∈ P (m), if p's cost is larger than c m , then p is not added toP m , and thus, PRM does not assign p. On the other hand, if p's cost is smaller than c m , then p is added toP m , and by Lemma 3.2 she is assigned by PRM to some slot and m is paid c m . From the above description it is clear that when m is truthful, he is paid for each assigned user p ∈ P (m) at least the cost of the user. Thus, PRM is IR for m. To see why truthfulness is a dominant strategy for m, notice that the utility function of m is maximized when all the users of m whose cost is less than c m are assigned, and no other user of m is assigned; which is exactly what PRM does when m is truthful.
Proving the incentive properties of PRM for the advertisers is more involved. We start by proving that PRM is IR for advertisers. Proof. PRM uses a VCG auction to assign users to advertisers, and to determine the cost each advertiser has to pay. Since VCG auctions are IR, the payment charged for every advertiser is upper bounded by the total value the advertiser gets from the users assigned to her.
In the rest of the section we concentrate proving that truthfulness is a dominant strategy for the advertisers under PRM . Let us fix an advertiser a ∈ A. For technical reasons it is convenient to somewhat enhance the strategy space of a. Clearly, if we can show that truthfulness is a dominant strategy for a given the enhanced strategy space, then this is also true given the original strategy space. Section 2.1 explains how ties between valuations of advertisers are broken using an order σ. In particular, when comparing the values of slots of two different advertisers with identical values, the values of the slots of the advertiser that appears earlier in σ are considered larger. We enhance the strategy space of a by allowing her to report both her value and her location in σ compared to the other advertisers and mediators. In other words, the relative order of the other advertisers and mediators in the order σ defining the tie-breaking rule is fixed, and a can choose to insert herself at any location within this order.
Given a possible strategy s for a, we denote by B s the set of slots given that a uses this strategy, and by ℓ(s) the lowest location in S c (P, B s ) of a slot of a. Note that, since the slots of a appear sequentially in S c (P, B s ), they must appear at locations ℓ(s) to ℓ(s) + u(a) − 1 in S c (P, B s ). Proof. ℓ(s) − 1 is equal to the total capacity of the advertisers appearing before the location set by the strategy s for a in the order σ. Since the capacity of every advertiser is at most γ, the values ℓ(s) corresponding to two adjacent possible locations for a in σ are different by at most γ. Moreover, if a is inserted by s as the first advertiser in σ than ℓ(s) = 1, and if a is inserted by s as the last advertiser in σ than ℓ(s) = |B| − (u(a) − 1) ≥ |B| − (γ − 1). Hence, for every list of consecutive indices of length at least γ such that all the indices are between 1 and |B| − (γ − 1), there must be a strategy s for a such that ℓ(s) is within this list. The next claims analyze some possible strategies for a. Lets be the strategy of a in which a reports a value of ∞, and letτ be the size of the canonical assignment S c (P, Bs). Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that |S c (P \ P (m), B s )| >τ , and let pτ +1 and bτ +1 be the user and slot, respectively, at locationτ + 1 in S c (P \ P (m), B s ). By our assumption, pτ +1 is assigned to bτ +1 , and therefore, v(bτ +1 ) > c(pτ +1 ).
Let us now define p ′τ +1 and b ′τ +1 to be the user and slot, respectively, at locationτ + 1 in S c (P, Bs). Clearly, pτ +1 appears at a location greater or equal toτ + 1 in S c (P, Bs), hence, c(pτ +1 ) ≥ c(p ′τ +1 ). If b ′τ +1 is a slot of a, then by definition v(b ′τ +1 ) = ∞ > v(bτ +1 ). Otherwise, the location of b ′τ +1 in S c (P \ P (m), B s ) must be smaller or equal toτ + 1 (its location in S c (P, Bs)), and thus, v(b ′τ +1 ) ≥ v(bτ +1 ). Combining all the inequalities we proved gives:
, which is a contradiction since b ′τ +1 and p ′τ +1 have the same location in S c (P, Bs), but p ′τ +1 is not assigned to b ′τ +1 by S c (P, Bs).
Using the last observation we can now prove the following lemma, which considers strategies of a with a relatively large ℓ(s). (m) , B s )| > 4γ, cτ −3γ is the cost of the user at locationτ − 3γ of S c (P, Bs), and thus, cτ −3γ ≥ c m . The fact that cτ −3γ ≥ max m∈M c m implies that m∈MP m contains only users whose cost is smaller than cτ −3γ , and there are onlyτ − 3γ − 1 such users. The VCG auction of PRM assigns the users of m∈MP m to the slots of B s at the lowest locations, and thus, only slots at locations 1 tō τ − 3γ − 1 have a potential to be assigned a user. Since we assume ℓ(s) ≥ τ − 3γ, no slot of a is among these slots, and thus, a is assigned no users by PRM.
The following lemma considers strategies of a with a relatively small ℓ(s). Proof. Consider two strategies s 1 and s 2 for a such that ℓ(s 1 ), ℓ(s 2 ) ≤τ − 2γ. Given that a uses strategy s 1 , PRM selects c m as the cost of the user at location |S c (P \ P (m),
. Similarly, given that that a uses strategy s 2 , PRM selects c m as the cost of the user at location |S c (P \ P (m),
We claim that in both cases the same c m is produced by PRM.
To see why this is the case observe that the two canonical assignments S c (P \ P (m), B s 1 ) and S c (P \ P (m), B s 2 ) share the order of the users, i.e., at a given location they both have the same user. Moreover, by Lemma 3.12:
We are now ready to prove that truthfulness is a dominant strategy for a. Lemma 3.14. Given PRM, truthfulness is a dominant strategy for advertiser a.
Proof. Ifτ ≤ 3γ, then, by Lemma 3.11, PRM does not assign any users regardless of the strategy used by a, and thus, any strategy is a dominant strategy for a. Hence, we may assumeτ > 3γ for the remaining part of the proof. Let s t be the truthful strategy of a, and letŝ be any strategy such thatτ − 3γ ≤ ℓ(ŝ) ≤τ − 2γ (such a strategy exists by Observation 3.9). There are now two cases to consider, depending on the relationship between ℓ(s t ) and ℓ(ŝ).
Consider first the case ℓ(s t ) ≤ ℓ(ŝ) ≤τ − 2γ. By Corollary 3.13, every strategy s for a having ℓ(s) ≤τ −2γ results in the same values c m for all mediators, and thus, PRM ends up using exactly the same VCG auction for all these strategies (up to the bid of the bidder corresponding to a). Since VCG auctions are incentive compatible, this means that reporting the truth is a best response for a among all the possible strategies s for a obeying ℓ(s) ≤τ − 2γ. Moreover, truthfulness guarantees a non-negative utility for a since PRM is advertiser-side IR by Observation 3.8. Thus, being truthful dominates also strategies s for a having ℓ(s) ≥τ − 2γ ≥τ − 3γ since such strategies result in 0 utility for a by Lemma 3.11.
Consider now the case ℓ(s t ) > ℓ(ŝ) ≥τ − 3γ. By Lemma 3.11 a is assigned no users (and thus, gets 0 utility) when she uses her truthful strategy s t . Let us observe what happens if advertiser a is modified so that her new truthful strategy isŝ. By Lemma 3.11 the modified a also gets 0 utility when using her truthful strategyŝ. On the other hand, the value of the modified advertiser for each user is at least as high as the value of the original advertiser, and thus, the modified advertiser gets at least as high utility as the original advertiser for every given outcome. Hence, to show that no strategy can give the original advertiser a positive utility, it is enough to show that the strategy maximizing the utility of the modified advertiser is her truthful strategyŝ; which follows immediately from the first case (since the truthful strategy for the modified advertiser isŝ, andŝ obeys ℓ(ŝ) ≤τ − 2γ). Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.14 since a is just an arbitrary fixed advertiser.
Randomized Mechanism
In this section we describe the randomized mechanism "Threshold by Partition Mechanism" (TPM) for our model. Unlike the mechanism PRM from Section 3, TPM need not assume public knowledge about the advertisers' capacities, i.e., the advertisers now have multi-dimensional strategy spaces. On the other hand, TPM assumes access to a value α ∈ [|S c (P, B)| −1 , 1] such that we are guaranteed that:
In other words, α is an upper bound on how large can be the capacity of an advertiser or the number of users of a mediator compared to the size of the optimal assignment S c (P, B) . We remind the reader that α is related to the value γ from Section 3 by the equation α = γ/τ , and thus, α, like γ, can be informally understood as a bound on the importance of every single advertiser or mediator.
It is important to note that α is well-defined only when |S c (P, B)| > 0, and thus, we assume this inequality is true throughout the rest of the section. A description of TPM is given as Mechanism 2. Notice that Mechanism 2 often refers to parameters of the model that are not known to the mechanism, such as the value of an advertiser or the number of users of a mediator. Whenever this happens, this should be understood as referring to the reported values of these parameters. 2. Let σ A be an arbitrary order over the advertisers that places the advertisers of A L after all the other advertisers and is independent of the reports received by the mechanism. Similarly, σ M is an arbitrary order over the mediators that places the mediators of M L after all the other mediators and is independent of the reports received by the mechanism.
3. Partition the mediators of M into two sets M 1 and M 2 by adding each mediator m ∈ M with probability 1/2, independently, to M 1 and otherwise to M 2 . Similarly, partition the advertisers of A into two sets A 1 and A 2 by adding each advertiser a ∈ A with probability 1/2, independently, to A 1 and otherwise to A 2 . The rest of the algorithm explains how to assign users of mediators from M 1 to slots of advertisers from A 1 , and how to charge advertisers of A 1 and pay mediators of M 1 . Analogous steps, which we omit, should be added for handling the advertisers of A 2 and the mediators of M 2 . It is important to note thatP andB are empty wheneverp andb are dummy user and slot, respectively.
Letp andb be the user and slot at location
⌈(1 − 4 3 √ α) · |S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 ))|⌉ of the canonical solution S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )). If (1 − 4 3 √ α) · |S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 ))| ≤ 0,
5.
While there are unassigned users inP and unassigned slots inB do the following:
• Let m be the earliest mediator in σ M having unassigned users inP .
• Let a be the earliest advertiser in σ A having unassigned slots inB.
• Assign the unassigned user ofP ∩ P (m) with the lowest cost to an arbitrary unassigned slot of B ∩ B(a), charge a payment of v(b) to advertiser a and transfer a payment of c(p) to mediator m. 6 Let us recall our result regarding TPM.
Intuitively, the analysis of TPM works by exploiting concentration results showing that the canonical assignments S c (P (M 1 ), B(A 1 )) and S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )) are not very different from each other. This similarity allows us to use information from S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )) to set the payments charged to advertisers of B(A 1 ) and payed to mediators of P (M 1 ), and vice versa, while keeping a reasonable competitive ratio. The advantage of setting the payments this way is that it reduces the control players have on the payments they have to pay or are paid, which helps the mechanism to be IC.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 1.2. We start with the following observation. Proof. We show that whenever TPM assigns a user p to a slot b, it charges the advertiser of b more than it pays the mediator of p. Consider an arbitrary ordered pair (p, b) from the assignment produced by TPM. We assume without loss of generality that p ∈ P (M 1 ); the other case is symmetric. The fact that p is assigned implies p ∈P , hence,P is non-empty. Similarly, the fact that a user is assigned to b implies thatB is not empty.
Recall that the fact thatP andB are not empty implies thatp andb are not dummy user and slot, respectively. This means thatp andb are matched by the canonical assignment S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )). Since a canonical assignment never assigns a user p ′ to a slot b ′ when c(p ′ ) > v(b ′ ), we get c(p) < v(b). The proof now completes by observing that the advertiser of b is charged v(b) for the assignment of p to b, while the mediator of p is paid c(p) for this assignment.
The Incentive Properties of TPM
In this section we prove the incentive parts of Theorem 1.2. Specifically, we prove that TPM is IR and IC. Proof. We prove the lemma only for mediators. The proof for advertisers is analogous (with slots exchanging roles with users, v(b) exchanging roles with c(p), etc.), and thus, we omit it. Additionally, we assume without loss of generality that m ∈ M 1 (the other case is symmetric).
Recall that TPM calculates a setP of users, and each user p ′ ∈ P (M 1 ) belongs toP if and only if her cost is lower than some threshold c(p). Additionally, note that TPM calculates the threshold c(p) based on the reports of advertisers and mediators in A 2 and M 2 , respectively. Thus, m, which belongs to M 1 , cannot affect this threshold. Similarly, m cannot affect the set of slotsB.
Whenever a user p ∈ P (m) is assigned to a slot the utility of m decreases by c(p) and increases by the payment m gets, which is c(p). In other words, the utility of m changes by c(p)− c(p). When m is truthful this change is always non-negative since p can be assigned only when she belongs tô P , which implies that the cost of p is smaller thanp. This already proves that the utility of m is non-negative when he is truthful, and thus, TPM is IR for m.
We claim that there exists a value k which is independent of the report of m such that for any report of m the mechanism assigns the min{k, |P ∩ P (m)|} users of m with the lowest reported costs. Before proving this claim, let us explain why the lemma follows from this claim. The above description shows that the utility of m changes by a c(p) − c(p) for every assigned user p ∈ P (m), thus, m wishes to assign as many as possible users having cost less than c(p), and if he cannot assign all of them then he prefers to assign the users with the lowest costs. By reporting truthfully m guarantees that only users of cost less than c(p) get toP , and thus, has a chance to be assigned. Moreover, by the above claim the mechanism assigns the k users ofP ∩ P (m) with the lowest costs (or all of them if |P ∩ P (m)| < k). Hence, the above claim indeed implies that truthfulness is a dominant strategy for m.
We are only left to prove the above claim. One can view TPM as considering the mediators according to the order σ M . For every mediator of m ′ ∈ M 1 TPM assigns the users ofP ∩ P (m ′ ) one by one (in an increasing reported costs order). Every assignment of a user "consumes" one unassigned slot ofB, and the assignment of users stops when all the users ofP are assigned, or there are no more unassigned slots inB. This means that if TPM assigns users to all the slots of B before considering m, then no user of m is assigned. The claim is true in this case with k = 0.
Otherwise, we choose k to be the number of unassignedB slots immediately before TPM considers m. Notice that the report of m does not affect the behavior of TPM up to the point it considers m, and thus, k is independent of the report of m. If there are more than k users inP ∩ P (m), then only the k of them with the lowest costs are assigned before TPM consumes all the unassigned slots ofB and stops. Otherwise, if |P ∩ P (m)| ≤ k then TPM manages to assigns all the users ofP ∩ P (m) before it runs out of unassigned slots ofB.
The Competitive Ratio of TPM
In this section we analyze the competitive ratio of TPM. Let us defineP (B) as the set of the users (slots) at locations 1 to ⌈(1 − 11 3 √ α)τ ⌉ of the canonical assignment S c (P, B) (P andB are defined as the empty set when 1 − 11 3 √ α ≤ 0). The following observation shows that most of the gain from trade of the canonical assignment S c (P, B) comes from the users and slots ofP andB, respectively. For convenience, let us denote by P o the set of users that are assigned by S c (P, B) , and by B o the set of slots that are assigned some user by S c (P, B) . (P, B) ).
Proof. If 1 − 11 3 √ α ≤ 0, then bothB andP are empty, and the inequality that we need to prove holds since its left hand side is 0 and its right hand side is non-positive (recall that S c (P, B) is an assignment of users from P to slots of B maximizing the gain from trade, and thus, its gain from trade is at least 0 since GfT(∅) = 0). Thus, we may assume in the rest of the proof that 1 − 11 3 √ α > 0.
SinceB contains the ⌈(1 − 11 3 √ α)τ ⌉ slots with the largest values among the slots of B o , we get:
Similarly, sinceP contains the ⌈(1 − 11 3 √ α)τ ⌉ users with the lowest costs among the users of P o , we get:
Combining the two inequities gives: (P, B) ) .
Observation 4.3 shows that one can prove a competitive ratio for TPM by relating the gain from trade of the assignment it produces to the gain from trade obtained by assigning the users ofP to the slotsB. The following lemma is a key lemma we use to relate the two gains. √ α such that E implies:
Proof. Assume first that the event E 1 holds. Lemma 4.4 shows that given E 1 we have |P \P (M L )| ≤ |B|, hence, TPM assigns at least |P \ P (M L )| users. Additionally, since TPM assigns all the users of P \ P (M L ) before it starts assigning users ofP ∩ P (M L ), we get that all the users ofP \ P (M L ) are assigned byŜ given E 1 . On the other hand, Lemma 4.4 also shows that given E 1 all the users of P ∩P (M 1 ) belong toP , and thus, the users of (P ∩P (M 1 ))\P (M L ) are all assigned byŜ. A similar argument shows that the slots of (B ∩ B(A 1 )) \ B(A L ) are all assigned users byŜ given E 1 . Finally, observe that E 1 also implies that c(p) ≤ ℓ(P, B) ≤ v(b) for every pair (p, b) ∈Ŝ ∩ (P (M 1 ) × B(A 1 )). TPM assigns users of P (M 2 ) to slots of B(A 2 ) in an analogous way to the assignment of users of P (M 1 ) to slots of B(A 1 ). Thus, by symmetry, there must exist an event E 2 of probability at least 1 − 10e −2/ 3 √ α (the probability of E 1 ) that guarantees the following three things.
• The users of (P ∩ P (M 2 )) \ P (M L ) are all assigned byŜ. Let us now define E as the event that both E 1 and E 2 happen together. By the union bound the probability of E is at least 1 − 20e −2/ 3 √ α as promised. Additionally, combining the properties that follow from E 1 and E 2 by the above discussion, we get that E implies the following properties.
• The users ofP \ P (M L ) are all assigned byŜ.
• The slots ofB \ B(A L ) are all assigned users byŜ.
• c(p) ≤ ℓ(P, B) ≤ v(b) for every pair (p, b) ∈Ŝ. The last property holds since TPM assigns users of P (M 1 ) (P (M 2 )) only to slots of B(A 1 ) (B(A 2 )), and thus, (Ŝ ∩ (P (M 2 ) × B(A 2 ))) ∪ (Ŝ ∩ (P (M 2 ) × B(A 2 ))) =Ŝ.
In the rest of the proof we assume that E happens. Consider an ordered pair (p, b) ∈Ŝ. The contribution of (p, b) to GfT(Ŝ) is:
Notice that the two terms that appear in brackets on the right hand side of the last equation are both positive given E. This allows us to lower bound the gain from trade ofŜ as follows:
Corollary 4.6. TPM is at least
Proof. The corollary is trivial when 28 3 √ α + 20e −2/ 3 √ α > 1. Thus, we assume in this proof 28
Since every slot belongs to B(A L ) with probability 17 3 √ α and every user belongs to P (M L ) with the same probability, we get: 
Recall (P, A) ) .
Plugging the last observations into Inequality 3 gives: (P, B) ) .
The corollary now follows by recalling that S c (P, B) is the assignment of users from P to slots of B which maximizes the gain from trade. 
Similarly, given a subset P ′ ⊆ P o and a probability q ∈ [0, 1], let P ′ [q] be a random subset of P ′ constructed as follows: for every mediator m ∈ M , independently, with probability q the users of mediator m that belong to P ′ appear also in P ′ [q]. Then, for every β ∈ (0, 1]:
Proof. We prove the first inequality; the second inequality is analogous. First, observe that the lemma is trivial when B ′ = ∅ since B ′ = ∅ implies ||B ′ [q]| − q · |B ′ || = 0 < βτ . Thus, we may assume in the rest of the proof B ′ = ∅. For every advertiser a ∈ A, let X a be an indicator for the event that slots of a appear in B ′ [q]. Then:
The definition of α implies |B(a)| ≤ ατ for every advertiser a ∈ A, and thus, 0 ≤ |B ′ ∩ B(a)| ≤ ατ . Hence, by Hoeffding's inequality:
Let E ′ be the event that the following inequalities are all true (at the same time): Next, we need the following useful observation. Assume towards a contradiction that the second inequality we need to prove is wrong. In other words, we assume |S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 ))| > max{|P o ∩ P (M 2 )|, |B o ∩ B(A 2 )|}. Let j = max{|P o ∩ P (M 2 )|, |B o ∩ B(A 2 )|} + 1, and let p ′ j and b ′ j be the user and slot at location j of S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )), respectively. Our assumption implies that (p ′ j , b ′ j ) belongs to S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )), and thus, c(p ′ j ) < v(b ′ j ). On the other hand, only the users at locations 1 to |P o ∩ P (M 2 )| of S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )) belong to P o , hence, p ′ j does not belong to P o . The user with the lowest cost that does not belong to P o is the user p τ +1 at location τ + 1 of S c (P, B) . Thus, we get: c(p ′ j ) ≥ c(p τ +1 ). Similarly, we can also get v(b ′ j ) ≤ v(b τ +1 ), where b τ +1 is the slot at location τ + 1 of S c (P, B). Combining the above inequalities gives:
, which contradicts the fact that p τ +1 is not assigned to b τ +1 by the canonical assignment S c (P, B) .
The next few claims use the last observation to prove a few properties that hold given E'. Proof. We prove the first inclusion. The other inclusion is analogous. Observation 4.9 and the definition of E ′ imply:
Using the definition of E ′ again gives:
Ifp is a dummy user thenP is empty, which makes the claimP ⊆ P o trivial. Thus, we may assume thatp is the user at location ⌈(1 − 4 3 √ α) · |S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 ))|⌉ of the canonical assignment S c (P (M 2 ), B(A 2 )). Hence, Inequality (4) and the observation that the users of P o ∩ P (M 2 ) are the users with the lowest costs in P (M 2 ) imply together thatp belongs to the set P o ∩ P (M 2 ) ⊆ P o . On the other hand, P o contains the τ users with the lowest costs. Hence, every user with a cost lower thanp must be in P o sincep is in P o . The lemma now follows by observing that the definition of P implies c(p) < c(p) for every user p ∈P . Proof. Let ℓ(P, B) be the value of the slot at location τ of the canonical assignment S c (P, B) . Clearly, ℓ(P, B) is independent of the random coins of TPM, as required. Additionally, for every slot b ∈ B o it holds that v(b) ≥ ℓ(P, B) since b must be located at some location of S c (P, B) between 1 and τ . On the other hand, let p τ be the user at location τ of S c (P, B) . Since the size of S c (P, B) is τ , p τ must be assigned to the slot at location τ of S c (P, B) , which implies c(p τ ) ≤ ℓ(P, B). 7 Moreover, for every user p ∈ P o it holds that c(p) ≤ c(p τ ) ≤ ℓ(P, B) since p must be located at some location of S c (P, B) between 1 and τ .
The lemma now follows since Lemma 4.10 shows that the event E ′ implies that every user p ∈P belongs also to P o , and every slot b ∈B belongs also to B o .
(small) bounded loss compared to the socially optimal outcome. To answer this question we presented two mechanisms. One mechanism that is deterministic and allows one side to have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces, and another mechanism that is randomized and allows two sides to have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces.
Our mechanisms significantly extend the literature on trade reduction-a technique used to achieve the basic economic properties of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and budget balance in a multi-sided market. While all the previous trade reduction solutions dealt with players having single dimensional strategic spaces, our deterministic algorithm performs a non-binary trade reduction which leads to the first trade reduction solution applying to multi-dimensional strategic spaces. As given, this deterministic trade reduction solution deals with two sides: advertisers and mediators; however, we believe that our ideas are more general, and we currently work on extending the mechanism in order to handle more market sides.
From a more practical point of view, our study is motivated by a foreseeable future form of online advertising in which users are incentivized to share their information via participation in a mediated online advertising exchange. Our model captures some of the challenges introduced by such exchanges, but does not encompass their online nature. In this sense our results in this paper can be seen as a step towards the study of a more realistic model which also captures the online nature of ad exchanges. 8 
